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AUDITOR SWITCHING AND  
THE GREAT DEPRESSION
Abstract: This paper explores the pattern of auditor switching in 
Canada before and during the Great Depression based on a sample 
of 1,344 financial statements. Hierarchical log linear analysis shows 
that there is a significant change in the pattern of switches. Prior to 
the Depression, the contemporary pattern of auditor switching is ob-
served; that is, there is a flow of clients from small to large audit firms 
and from Canadian to international audit firms. During the Depres-
sion, however, this flow of clients is reversed with large international 
firms losing clients through switches, on average, to Canadian and 
smaller audit firms. The contemporary audit literature suggests pos-
sible reasons for the observed patterns in terms of the demand for 
higher quality audits by clients and audit firms’ risk management of 
potential client bankruptcy. 
 This paper explores changes in the pattern of auditor/cli-
ent switching and continuity in Canada before and during the 
Great Depression of the 1930s. The Great Depression has been 
referred to as a “defining moment” in economic history [Bordo 
et al., 1998]. It provides a setting that allows the market’s re-
sponse to shocks to be assessed. The shock to the audit market 
was twofold. First, the Depression exposed the securities market 
manipulations of the late 1920s and made potential and current 
investors aware of the importance of credible financial informa-
tion for assessing the liquidity, solvency, and future earnings 
potential of firms [Previts and Merino, 1979, p. 245]. This shock 
increased the value of the audit as a signal of the quality and 
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credibility of financial statements and, hence, provided incen-
tives for client firms to switch to higher reputation auditors.1
 The second impact of the Depression was to increase dra-
matically the risk of financial distress and bankruptcy faced by 
client firms and, derivatively, the risk of loss of reputation and 
litigation for damages faced by auditors. Audit firms must assess 
the risks posed by their portfolios of clients in order to ensure 
their profitability and survival. This will involve a pre-engage-
ment assessment of the risk of new clients and the resignation 
from engagements with existing clients where the risk level has 
become unacceptable. The Depression dramatically, if tempo-
rarily, increased the average risk level of auditors’ portfolios of 
clients. This could result in auditor switches initiated by the au-
ditor in order to maintain an acceptable level of risk in its port-
folio of clients. 
 The Great Depression also coincided with significant 
changes in the regulation of the audit market in some countries 
[Edwards, 1989]. In the U.S., the Securities Exchange Acts of 
1933 and 1934 increased the disclosure requirements of publicly 
listed firms and increased the auditor’s liability for fraudulent 
statements. While the effect and intent of such legislation on 
the stock markets is subject to debate [Benston, 1973; Merino 
and Neimark, 1982; Cooper and Keim, 1983; Tinker, 1984], its 
impact on the U.S. auditing profession is less controversial. The 
audit profession emerged from the Depression with a statutory 
demand for its services, revised audit objectives (i.e., the change 
in focus from the balance sheet to the income statement and the 
greater emphasis on the “fairness” of the financial statements 
rather than the accuracy of their tracking of transactions), and 
greater liability for misleading financial statements [Gilman, 
1939]. 
 In countries of the British Commonwealth, audited finan-
cial statements were required by statute well before the De-
pression (1844 in the U.K., 1907 in Canada). In these countries, 
there was no immediate legislative response to the financial 
reporting issues exposed by the Depression. Nonetheless, the 
Depression also coincides with changes in the practice of audit-
ing in these countries [Chandler et al., 1993]. In the U.K., the 
1931 Royal Mail Steam Packet Case, where secret reserves were 
used to hide deteriorating performance, is widely credited with 
increasing the emphasis on the income statement and the qual-
1See Lieberman [2001] for a discussion of periodization strategies including 
the “exogenous shock” approach used here.
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ity of earnings, although an audited income statement was not 
required by law in the U.K. until 1947 [Edwards, 1989]. Similar-
ly in Canada, there is evidence of a change in auditing practice 
even though the disclosure of audited income statements was 
not required until 1951 as a professional standard and 1953 as a 
matter of legislation [Anderson, 1977, p. 10]. In these countries, 
then, changes in the demand for audit services were played out 
in the marketplace and professional practice rather than being 
brought about explicitly through regulation.
 This paper explores the relationship between the Great 
Depression and patterns of auditor switching and continuity in 
Canada based on a sample of audited financial statements dated 
between 1910 and 1941. The Depression in Canada was as se-
vere as that in the U.S. [De Long, 1997], but this setting provides 
an opportunity to observe the relationship between the Depres-
sion and changes in behavior of the audit market in the absence 
of changes in government regulation of auditing coincident with 
that event.
 The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the 
contemporary literature on auditor switching is reviewed. This 
review suggests that the Depression may have had contrary ef-
fects on the supply and demand sides of the audit market. On 
the demand side, four explanatory models of auditor switching 
each suggest that clients should prefer larger, better reputation 
auditors when the demand for credible financial information 
increases. On the supply side, the literature suggests that as the 
financial risks of clients increase, auditors should be more likely 
to resign in order to maintain a profitable portfolio of lower risk 
clients. The institutional context of the Canadian audit market 
between 1910 and 1941 is then discussed to identify which of 
these models may apply in this setting. This is followed by a 
description of the data used and presentation of an analysis of 
auditor continuity and switching behavior before and during the 
Depression. The paper ends with a discussion and some histori-
cal speculation on the results.
PRIOR LITERATURE AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
 The audit market is highly differentiated with a wide range 
of sizes of audit firms as well as audit firm specialization in geo-
graphic and industry-specific markets [Yardley et al., 1992]. The 
decision by a client to hire or retain an auditor and the decision 
by the auditor to accept or retain a client is a complex process 
subject to many variables. The sections below review the domi-
3
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nant supply and demand side theories of auditor switching in 
the contemporary literature.
The Demand for Audit Services: Our understanding of the dy-
namics of the audit market is largely based on data from the last 
30 years in the U.S. This stream of research was triggered by the 
1976 U.S. Senate’s investigation into the “accounting establish-
ment” [Metcalfe, 1976]. The report documented the growing 
concentration of the supply of audit services to publicly traded 
companies by a small group of audit firms and their influence 
on the standard-setting process. It was not clear, however, 
whether this oligopoly was a result of market forces or uncom-
petitive behavior by the firms. The report lead to a series of stud-
ies that examined such things as the pricing of audit services 
[Simunic, 1980], the initial choice of auditors by firms [Simunic 
and Stein, 1987], and the pattern of auditor switches, the sub-
ject of this paper. The argument was made that if audit pricing, 
 auditor choice, and auditor switches could be explained by eco-
nomically reasonable matching of the characteristics of auditors 
and clients, then the structure of the industry could be attrib-
uted to competitive market forces rather than to attempts by the 
firms to gain monopoly power. 
 This paper focuses on the pattern of auditor switching and 
continuity. The dominant pattern identified in contemporary 
 literature has been a persistent shift of clients from small to 
large audit firms. There are four explanations for this pattern. 
First, clients may be using the reputation for quality of the 
larger firms to increase the credibility of their financial state-
ments [DeFond, 1992; Teoh and Wong, 1993; Colbert, 1998]. In 
the face of uncertainty about the possible quality of auditors, 
a “brand name” may signal better monitoring of management 
reporting and lower agency costs. In order for this mechanism 
to be operative, the brand-name effect must be stronger than the 
quality effect provided by licensure and the minimum education 
standards required as a prerequisite for licensure. This effect is 
also consistent with “premium” pricing for the services of larger 
firms in competitive markets [Francis, 1984; Bandyopadhyay 
and Kao, 2001].
 Second, clients may be relying on the “deep pockets” of 
large audit firms and liberal liability laws to provide insurance 
to potential users of financial statements in the event of an audit 
(or business) failure [Beatty, 1993; Menon and Williams, 1994]. 
The extent to which audit firms have been held liable for damag-
es to clients and third parties varies across countries and across 
4
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time. The large firms have claimed that there is a liability crisis 
in auditing [cf., Freedman, 1993; Schuetze, 1993]. They suggest 
that the audit market may collapse if auditors are exposed to 
claims from all potential users of financial statements if there 
are no limits on the extent of their liability. These arguments 
lead to calls for proportionate liability and incorporation of pro-
fessional practices as means of limiting liability [Kirby, 1997]. 
This explanation appears to be particularly relevant to the U.S. 
where third party liability and class action suits against auditors 
are more likely to hold. 
 Third, there may be economies of scale or scope in the au-
dit market such that larger audit firms can produce services at 
lower cost than smaller firms [Francis and Stokes, 1986]. The 
economy of scale argument implies that there is a pool of fixed 
costs associated with the operation of the audit firm. These costs 
may include the costs of administration, research, information 
systems, and the fixed costs associated with the complement of 
partners of the firm. If there are economies of scale, clients may 
switch to larger audit firms as they grow in order to take ad-
vantage of audit efficiencies. The economies of scope argument 
implies that the audit firm can supply multiple services to a 
 client less expensively than several firms supplying each service 
independently [AICPA, 1997]. The economy of scope argument 
usually links information flows from the audit to management 
consulting [cf., Shu, 2000]. If there are economies of scope, a 
client may switch auditors as its needs for non-audit ser-
vices grow to allow one firm to provide both sets of services. 
Note, however, that economies of scope may involve offsetting 
 problems associated with maintaining the independence of the 
audit.
 Finally, if the audit is indivisible, clients may need to switch 
to larger firms as they grow to get the service they require [Ben-
ston, 1979; Chan, 1995]. Doogar and Easley [1998] demonstrate 
that the existing distribution of the sizes of audit firms can be 
derived from the distribution of the sizes of client firms using 
this assumption. This may apply to the need for the audit firm 
to provide service over an extended geographic range or to the 
size of the audit team required to complete the work on a timely 
basis. For example, Richardson [2001] notes that the change 
in strategy of Canadian banks from raising money from com-
mercial term deposits and share subscriptions to reliance on de-
mand deposits resulted in an expanded retail banking network 
that many smaller audit firms could not service.
 We will consider the relevance of these theories to the 
5
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 current study; i.e., the time period surrounding the Great 
 Depression in Canada, after reviewing contemporary theory 
concerned with the supply of audit services.
The Supply of Audit Services: The literature examining the sup-
ply of audit services is of more recent origin. It can be dated to 
the bankruptcy of the audit firm Laventhol and Horvath in the 
U.S. in 1990. At that time it was the seventh largest audit firm in 
the U.S. but was unable to bear the costs of litigation of charges 
of negligence in a number of business failures during the 1980s. 
This event highlighted the importance to audit firms of manag-
ing the riskiness of their portfolios of clients (i.e., the business 
risk to the audit firm in addition to the risk of rendering an 
incorrect audit opinion [audit risk]) [cf., Brumfield et al., 1983; 
Jubb et al., 1996]. Subsequent research has demonstrated that 
audit firms take the riskiness of clients into account in setting 
their fees and respond to changes in business risks by adjusting 
their portfolios of clients away from those facing liquidity and 
solvency problems [Krishnan and Krishnan, 1997; Jones and 
Raghunandan, 1998; Johnstone and Bedard, 2004]. 
 Shu [2000] documents that clients whose auditors resigned 
were more likely to move to a smaller audit firm. This would 
occur if the risks of litigation/reputation loss are less to smaller 
firms if the smaller firms have different risk tolerances than 
larger firms, or if smaller firms were industry specialists with su-
perior knowledge of business risks [Menon and Williams, 1999; 
DeFond et al., 2000]. This literature thus suggests that in times 
of increased business risk, large audit firms will protect their 
reputations by resigning from, not renewing, or refusing engage-
ments where they are unable to assess or manage the business 
risk. 
The Canadian Institutional Environment: This section reviews 
the Canadian institutional environment to identify the demand 
and supply issues noted in the theoretical literature that are 
most likely to affect auditor switching and continuity in the pe-
riod prior to the World War II in Canada. First, the reputation 
or quality differences among firms are likely to be larger during 
this period than in contemporary studies. Licensing require-
ments for public accountants were not instituted until 1946 in 
Canada, beginning in Quebec. This means that there were no 
minimum quality standards for auditors during the pre-Depres-
sion or Depression periods. In addition, the audit market was 
considerably less concentrated, and the number of audit firms 
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active in the market was larger than is the case in many con-
temporary markets [Danos and Eichenseher, 1986; Richardson, 
2001]. It is reasonable, therefore, to assume that the variation in 
quality among auditors in this period was greater than usually 
encountered in contemporary auditor switching studies.
 Second, the auditors’ exposure to legal liability is signifi-
cantly less in Commonwealth countries than in the U.S. [An-
derson, 1977, p. 95; Baker, 1996]. The common law exempts 
auditors from liability to third parties under the strict privity 
of contract doctrine. This doctrine was first introduced into the 
area of auditors’ legal liability by the Ultramares case in the 
early 1930s [Ultramares v. Touche 174 N.E. 441 N.Y. 1931]. Al-
though this case was tried in the U.S., it is widely cited in U.K. 
and Canadian courts. In the U.S., this doctrine has been super-
seded by the liability provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Securities 
Acts for listed companies. More recently, some states have also 
applied broader liability rules based on the Restatement of Torts 
(Second) Section 522 or by the “reasonably foreseeable” doc-
trine introduced in Rosenblum [In. v. Adler 461 A.2d 138 N.J. 
1983]. In the Canadian environment, and particularly during 
the period examined, the auditor’s liability for negligence was 
 limited to the client.
 Even though the risk of litigation was relatively lower than 
at present, audit firms sought to avoid financially distressed 
 clients to protect their reputations and the stability of their fee 
income. Cowperthwaite [1986, p. 22], for example, notes that 
both Peat Marwick and Price Waterhouse refused to audit stock 
brokerages during the Depression because of their financial 
condition and the low reputation in which some stock broker-
age firms were held. He also notes that an unsuccessful lawsuit 
against the firm during this period resulted in the loss of clients 
because of the suggestion that the firm had failed in its duties 
[Cowperthwaite, 1986, p. 4]. There was a need to manage the          
business risk faced by the audit firm and to protect the audit 
firm’s reputation.
 A methodological note is in order at this point. In con-
temporary tests of the auditor client-portfolio adjustment hy-
pothesis, researchers partition their sample into those clients 
that are experiencing financial distress and those that are not.         
This partitioning is based on financial statement accounts. Two 
problems prevent this approach in this paper. First, the required 
financial disclosures by firms in Canada during this period were 
limited to the balance sheet. While some firms disclosed income 
statements, it was not common practice and such statements 
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were unaudited. Thus, it is impossible to partition firms on the 
basis of earnings. Second, it is well documented that during this 
period, a firm experiencing financial downturns might use secret 
reserves to maintain the appearance of a sound balance sheet 
and to pay dividends [Bliss, 1987, p. 424].2 This practice usu-
ally became public knowledge only if the firm ultimately failed. 
Consequently, it is inadvisable to examine the effect of the fi-
nancial condition of particular client firms on auditor switching 
based on published financial statements. In addition, the cause 
of auditor switches was not disclosed during this period so the 
competing explanations presented above cannot be differenti-
ated directly by the reason for the switch. The Great Depression, 
however, affected all sectors of the economy [cf., Urquhart and 
Buckley, 1965], and, hence, it is reasonable to assume that there 
were supply-side adjustments across the entire pattern of audi-
tor switches.
 Third, the potential for economies of scale was very limited 
at this time. Auditing during this period was a labor-intensive 
process; the use of statistical sampling and computer-aided au-
dits did not occur until well after World War II. The main basis 
for economies of scale was the use of junior staff to undertake 
audit procedures. This source of leverage was equally available 
to all but the smallest audit firms and is unlikely to have given 
any subset of the firms in this sample a comparative advantage. 
The same can be said of the potential for economies of scope. 
During this period, the firms’ main lines of business were audit-
ing and, after World War I, tax advice [Little, 1964; Jones, 1981]. 
The contemporary arguments about economies of scope rely on 
the transfer of information between the audit and consulting 
functions [Shu, 2000]. Although management consulting prac-
tice can be dated to the development of scientific management 
in the early 1900s, it really did not become a significant business 
until after World War II [Mellett, 1988].
 Fourth, it is possible that auditor switching was related to 
the size and reputation of audit firms. The reputation of the 
audit firm, or the quality of the audit performed, has frequently 
been inferred by its dominance of the market [Davidson and 
Neu, 1993]. The large audit firms (the Big-Eight, Six, or Five 
depending on the time period of the study) are usually regarded 
2Other techniques included misreporting loans as equity [e.g., in the railroad 
industry, Thomson, 1938] and using alternative valuation bases to avoid write-
downs on securities [e.g., in the financial services sector, Bliss, 1988, pp. 416-
424]. 
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as being equal in quality and differentiated from smaller audit 
firms [Francis and Simon, 1987; Beatty, 1993]. This assumption 
has been validated by showing that these firms are paid a pre-
mium for their services in competitive markets [Francis, 1984; 
Bandyopadhyay and Kao, 2001]. 
 Francis and Simon [1987] explicitly test for and do not find 
a price premium for second-tier (“national”) audit firms in their 
sample. Their work suggests that the contemporary reputation 
effect in auditing is limited to the “brand name,” international 
accounting firms. Contrary to this, Krishnan and Schauer [2000] 
find that audit quality, measured as compliance with GAAP 
among non-profit organizations, is also related to the size of 
firm among non-Big-Six firms. DeFond et al. [2000] find both 
discount and premium pricing among specialist audit firms. 
These results suggest that reputation/quality may be reflected by 
the large international audit firms but that size may also affect 
the perceived and/or actual quality of audits beyond this group 
of firms.
 In Canada during this period, both international and Cana-
dian firms held positions as market leaders while some of the 
international firms that dominate other markets were minor 
suppliers in this market (e.g., Deloitte, Ernst) [Matthews et al., 
1998, pp. 46-47 for a ranking of U.K. firms; McKee and Garner, 
1992, p. 14 for a ranking of U.S. firms during this period]. In 
this study, the six largest firms include three Canadian firms and 
three “international” firms, originating in either the U.K. or the 
U.S. These firms are at least 20% larger than their closest rivals. 
This situation allows us to observe the effects of size, quality de-
fined by local market share, and international reputation defined 
by membership in the set of dominant international firms inde-
pendently. 
 Overall, the audit market environment at this time suggests 
that auditor switching by clients may have been related to the 
reputation/quality auditors or by a desire to lower the cost of 
their audit through the use of larger auditors. Simultaneously, 
audit firms were concerned about the effect of client failure 
on their reputations and the stability of their income streams. 
These factors are assumed to affect the entire period but to have 
different weights in the pre-Depression versus Depression peri-
ods as discussed below. There will also be auditor switches for 
other reasons such as price and opinion shopping, death and 
retirement of auditor partners, etc. These factors are assumed 
to be randomly distributed across time and are unlikely to be 
systematically related to the occurrence of the Great Depression. 
9
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These factors, however, may be systematically related to the 
size of the audit firm and, hence, would explain the consistently 
higher rate of switches among small audit firms. 
 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
 The literature suggests that the market for audits funda-
mentally changed after the Great Depression due to a greater 
emphasis on the earnings capacity of the firm and greater reli-
ance on audited financial statements as the indicator of that ca-
pacity. This shift increased the importance of auditor reputation 
to clients. The Depression also resulted in a sudden, but tempo-
rary, shift in the risk profile of many clients, providing incentives 
for auditors to realign their portfolios of clients to manage their 
business risk. Since there is a discontinuity in the nature of the 
demand for and supply of audits, we hypothesize that the dis-
tribution of clients over categories of auditor will be affected. 
Based on the contemporary literature on auditor switching, we 
expect that the pattern of auditor switches will be related to 
the local market share (size) and/or international status/reputa-
tion of the audit firms involved in the switches. The theoretical 
literature and contemporary evidence suggest that prior to the 
Depression, the pattern of auditor switching should favor large 
international firms. The auditor switching literature, however, 
does not provide a theoretical basis for predicting the direction 
of the change in auditor switching behavior during the Depres-
sion. 
 Given the discussion above, we test a non-directional hy-
pothesis about the change in the pattern of auditor switches 
during the Depression (in alternative form): 
H1 The pattern of auditor switching among catego-
ries of audit firms in Canada will differ during the 
Great Depression compared with the pre-Depres-
sion period.
In addition to testing this hypothesis, we explore the pattern 
of auditor switches for evidence of consistencies in the average 
flow of clients among categories of auditors under different cir-
cumstances from which can be inferred the relative reputation 
of large international and Canadian audit firms (and others) 
during this period. 
 
Data: The paper is based on financial statements published in 
The Annual Financial Review, Canadian [Briggs and Houston] 
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at five-year intervals from 1906 to 1941.3 The Review was pub-
lished between 1902 and 1941, when it ceased publication. It 
presented a summary of the annual reports of major Canadian 
firms through this time period. The summary included the main 
financial statement information and the names of key officers. 
It did not include the auditors’ certificate and, prior to 1906, 
did not disclose the name of the auditor, if any.4 This series has 
been used as a source of information about Canadian financial 
reporting practices in the absence of archives of early Canadian 
annual reports [Murphy, 1988; Richardson, 2001].
 In order to be included in the sample, financial statements 
for each company were required for at least two periods along 
with the reported name of the auditor. These criteria yielded 
1,836 financial statements from 492 firms. In order to observe 
auditor changes or continuity, the first observation from each 
series (492 financial statements) is dropped. The sample gener-
ates 1,344 temporally ordered pairs of financial statements that 
include 310 cases where clients switched auditors. Switches in-
volved 195 client firms with 1.59 as the mean number of switch-
es per firm and a standard deviation of 0.9. The data were di-
vided into two sets using 1930 as the dividing line.5 This resulted 
in 648 financial statements from 383 firms for the pre-Depres-
sion period, including 186 auditor changes involving 133 firms, 
and 696 financial statements from 418 firms for the Depression 
period, including 124 auditor changes involving 103 firms.6 A 
supplementary analysis, described below, focuses on those 167 
firms that appeared in both periods.
 To facilitate analysis, the audit firms were divided into three 
categories based on their market share throughout the entire 
period and their country of origin based on the method used 
in Richardson [2001]. The market is concentrated with the six 
largest firms accounting for 45% of all audits. Further, there is a 
discrete break between the sixth largest and seventh largest firm 
3The firms used represent those cases where there were (1) at least two finan-
cial statements available and (2) the auditor was listed. A total of 3,661 financial 
statements were included in the source material. 
4The disclosure of the auditor in this series coincides with debates leading to 
the statutory requirement for audited balance sheets added to the Ontario Com-
panies Act in 1907. 
5The Great Depression is usually dated from the stock market crash in Octo-
ber 1929. The first financial statements impacted by the Depression would have 
appeared in 1930.
6Some firms appear in both periods so the number of firms in the sub-periods 
does not equal the overall number of firms.
11
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(the sixth largest is almost 20% larger than the seventh largest) 
so that it is reasonable to treat these six firms as a distinct group. 
The largest firms include three Canadian firms (Clarkson, Ross, 
and Riddell) and three international firms (Price Waterhouse, 
Touche, and Peat Marwick). These subgroups are identified as 
the Canadian Big-3 and the International Big-3 in the analyses. 
The remaining firms are referenced to as “Other.”7
 For each financial statement pair, we identified in the data-
base the categories of the initial auditor and the auditor of the 
subsequent set of financial statements. For the subsequent audi-
tor, an additional category of “no change” was added to allow us 
to examine patterns of continuity as well as patterns of switches 
in the data. We also separated the financial statements into two 
categories based on the year-end as being in either the pre-De-
pression (before 1930) or Depression (1930 and after). The data 
are thus captured in a 3x4x2 (initial auditor * subsequent audi-
tor * time period) contingency table.
Analyses: To explore the distribution of observations among the 
cells in the matrix described above, we specify the following 
saturated model: 
log misd = µ + λI + λS+ λD +λIS +λID + λSD + λISD
Where: 
•	 m = cell frequency for a given combination of I, S, and D 
(indexed by i, s, and d)
•	 µ = the logarithm of the mean cell frequency across all 
conditions
•	 λ = a parameter to be estimated (the increase/decrease in 
cell frequency due to I, S, D and their interactions)
•	 I = auditor category in the initial period
•	 S = auditor category in the subsequent period
•	 D = the time period (either Depression or pre-Depression 
time period)
 The model was estimated using hierarchical log linear 
analysis. This technique is appropriate for categorical data as it 
requires no assumptions about the distribution of variables and 
does not require a specification of the direction of relationships. 
Given H1, we use this model to test for a significant three-way 
interaction (I*S*D); i.e., does the pattern of switches between 
7The original coding separated “Other Canadian” and “Other International”    
depending on their country of origin. Due to the small numbers of clients of “Oth-
er International” in the data, these two categories were combined for analysis. 
12
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categories of auditors change between the pre-Depression and 
Depression periods? The results are shown in Table 1. Based on 
a likelihood ratio chi-square, we observe a significant loss of cat-
egorization ability if the three-way interaction is dropped from 
the model (LR Chi-square = 18.6, p<0.05). From this result, we 
conclude that H1 is supported. 
TABLE 1
Analysis of Patterns of Auditor Continuity and Switching
Model: log misd = µ + λI + λS+ λD +λIS +λID + λSD + λISD
Where: 
•	 µ = the logarithm of the mean cell frequency across all conditions
•	 λ = a parameter 
•	 m = cell frequency for a given combination of I, S and D (indexed by i, s, 
and d)
•	 I = auditor category in the initial period (International Big-3, Canadian 
Big-3, and Other)
•	 S = the auditor category in the subsequent period (no change, Interna-
tional Big-3,
•	  Canadian Big-3, and Other)
•	 D = the time period (either Depression or pre-Depression time period)
H1: the pattern of auditor switching among categories of audit firms in Canada            
will differ during the Great Depression compared with the pre-depression 
period (the three-way interaction between I, S, and D is not zero)           
Tests that K-way and higher order effects are zero (n=1,344).
K Model  DF L.R. Chi-square Probability 
3 log misd = µ + λI + λS+ λD +λIS +λID + λSD  6  18.582   .0049 
2 log misd = µ + λI + λS+ λD  17 163.294   .0000 
1 log misd = µ  23 2,160.622   .0000 
Tests of partial associations
Effect Name  DF  Partial Chi-square Probability 
 Initial auditor*Time period λID  6   97.936  .0000 
 Initial auditor*Subsequent auditor λIS  2   11.958  .0025 
 Subsequent auditor*Time period λSD  3   17.301  .0006 
 Initial auditor λI  2   263.184  .0000 
 Subsequent auditor λS 3   1,732.429  .0000 
 Time period λD  1 1.715   .1904 
 The results also show that the main effects, with the ex-
ception of “D,” and the two-way interactions are statistically 
significant. Although these results are not of direct relevance to 
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the hypothesis, they are discussed here for completeness. The 
lack of significance of “D” (the time period) simply means there 
is no significant difference in the number of observations in the 
pre-Depression and Depression periods. The significant main ef-
fects on “I” (the initial auditor) and “S” (the subsequent auditor) 
means that clients were not evenly distributed across categories 
of auditors. The significant two-way interactions mean that (a) 
auditor switching changed the distribution of clients across 
categories of auditors over the entire period (I*S), (b) the dis-
tribution of clients across categories of initial auditors differed 
between time periods (I*D), and (c) the distribution of clients 
across categories of subsequent auditors differed between time 
periods (S*D). The significant three-way interaction, noted 
above, controls for all of these effects.
 Table 2 provides a tabular summary of the data. Panel A 
shows the pattern of continuity and auditor switches among 
classes of audit firms during the pre-Depression period. This 
panel shows that there was less client turnover among the large 
firms than smaller firms during this period and that the interna-
tional audit firms had the lowest rate of turnover. The lower sec-
tion of Panel A provides the distribution of switches among cat-
egories of auditors during the pre-Depression period. Consistent 
with contemporary studies, the large international firms were 
gaining clients through switches (e.g., 3.2% of switches were 
away from the Big-3 international firms, but 18.8% of switches 
were to Big-3 International firms from other categories of audi-
tors). Similarly, the Big-3 Canadian firms were gaining clients 
through switches (11.8% vs. 12.9%). The small firms were, on 
average, losing clients through switches during this period 
(84.9% vs. 68.3%).8 
 Panel B of Table 2 provides the same data for the Depression 
period. Two changes are evident; first, there is significantly9 less 
turnover among small audit firm clients although total turnover 
has increased. Second, the direction of switches among auditor 
categories has changed. The Big-3 international firms were, on 
average, losing clients through switches during the Depression 
8Some changes in auditor from one class to another may have been associated 
with mergers between accounting firms. We assume that these represent choice 
points for the auditor and client about whether or not to change categories of au-
ditor and are, in principle, no different than any other auditor switching event.
9The significance of individual cells is based on a test of the Pearson residuals 
comparing the observed data and a model assuming independence of the three 
factors used in the log linear model [Friendly, 1994]. All references to significant      
results are based on a p<0.05.
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Auditor Continuity and Switches
Panel A: Auditor Continuity and Switches during the Pre-Depression Period 
Pre-Depression Sample Auditor in Subsequent Period









Big-3 95.6% 1.5% 0.7% 2.2% 100%
Canadian 
Big- 3 81.2% 6.8% 2.6% 9.4% 100%
Other 59.9% 6.3% 5.1% 28.7% 100%
Full Sample 71.3% 5.4% 3.7% 19.6% N = 648




Big-3 1.1% 0.5% 1.6% 3.2%
Canadian
Big- 3 4.3% 1.6% 5.9% 11.8%
Other 13.4% 10.8% 61.1% 84.9%
% Client 
Gains 18.8% 12.9% 68.3% N = 186
Panel B: Auditor Continuity and Switches during the Depression 
Depression Sample Auditor in Subsequent Period









Big-3 89.8% 1.9% 3.9% 4.4% 100%
Canadian 
Big- 3 84.8% 2.6% 0.7% 11.9% 100%
Other 76.4% 3.5% 5.0% 15.02% 100%
% of Sample 82.2% 2.9% 3.7% 11.2% N = 696




Big- 3 3.2% 6.5% 7.3% 16.9%
Canadian
 Big- 3 3.2% 0.8% 14.5% 18.6%
Other 9.7% 14.7% 41.1% 64.5%
% Client 
Gains 16.1% 21.0% 62.9% N = 124
Panel C: Changes in the Pattern of Auditor Switches  
(Depression – Pre-Depression Periods)
Changes in the Percentage of 





Big- 3 2.2% 5.9% 5.6%
Canadian 
Big- 3 -1.1% -0.8% 8.6%
Other -3.8% 3.0% -19.6%
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while small audit firms were less likely to suffer clients switch-
ing. Panel C of Table 2 provides a summary of the changes. 
 Of particular significance are the cells above the diagonal in 
the matrix in Panel C of Table 2. These cells capture the change 
in the flow of clients among categories of audit firms during 
the Depression. All these changes are positive and statistically 
significant indicating that during the Depression, there was an 
increase in switches from International Big-3 firms to the Big-3 
Canadian firms and “Other” firms (changes of 5.9% and 5.6% re-
spectively) and from Canadian Big-3 firms to “Others” (a change 
of 8.6%) when compared to the pre-Depression period. 
 The second analysis, reported below, uses those firms in the 
data base for which at least one financial statement is available 
both before and during the Depression. The additional restric-
tions reduce the sample size and hence the power of the tests, 
but this subset of the data allows each firm to act as its own 
control to remove possible effects due to changes in industry 
composition between the two periods, possible survivorship 
bias, and other factors associated with the change in client pop-
ulations. This sample includes 167 firms generating 779 tempo-
rally ordered pairs of financial statements. There are 189 auditor 
switches among this group, 118 from the pre-Depression period 
involving 80 firms (based on 444 pairs of financial statements) 
and 71 from the post-1930 period involving 54 firms (based on 
331 pairs of financial statements). 
 The hierarchical log linear analysis results for these data 
are consistent with those reported above. There is a significant 
three-way interaction effect (LR Chi-square 12.1, d.f.=6, p<0.06, 
N=779) indicating that the pattern of auditor switches changed 
between the pre-Depression and Depression periods. The pat-
tern of auditor switches in this sample is also consistent with 
the results from the full sample described above. In particular 
also, the bottom panel of Table 3 shows that the changes in per-
centage of switches above the diagonal are again all positive, 
indicating an increased flow of clients from Big-3 International 
firms to Big-3 Canadian firms and smaller firms during the De-
pression.
DISCUSSION
 The data provide evidence that there was a statistically 
significant change in the pattern of auditor switching during 
the Depression compared with the pre-Depression period in 
Canada. In the pre-Depression period, as well as for the entire 
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Auditor Continuity and Switches  
(Firms in Both the  Pre-Depression  
and Depression Samples)
Panel A: Auditor Continuity and Switches during the Pre-Depression Period 
Pre- 
Depression Sample
Auditor in Subsequent Period
TotalNo Change International Big-3
Canadian 
Big-3 Other




Big-3 95.1% 1.0% 1.0% 2.9% 100%
Canadian 
Big-3 85.7% 6.5% 0% 7.8% 100%
Other 61.5% 5.7% 6.4% 26.4% 100%
% of Sample 73.4% 4.7% 4.1% 17.8% N = 444




Big-3 0.8% 0.8% 2.5% 4.3%
Canadian 
Big-3 4.2% 0% 5.1% 9.3%
Other 12.7% 14.4% 59.3% 86.4%
% Client 
Gains 19.2% 14.6% 66.2% N = 118
Panel B: Auditor Continuity and Switches during the Depression 
Depression Sample Auditor in Subsequent Period









Big-3 89.2% 2.9% 4.9% 2.9% 100%
Canadian 
Big-3 79.0% 3.2% 1.6% 16.2% 100%
Other 73.0% 2.2% 5.4% 19.5% 100%
% of Sample 78.6% 2.7% 4.8% 13.9% N = 335




Big-3 4.2% 7.0% 4.2% 15.4%
Canadian 
Big-3 2.8% 1.4% 14.1% 18.3%
Other 5.6% 14.1% 46.5% 66.2%
% Client 
Gains 12.7% 22.5% 64.8% N = 71
Panel C: Changes in the Pattern of Auditor Switches  
(Depression – Pre-Depression Periods)
Changes in the Percentage of 





Big-3 3.4% 6.2% 1.7%
Canadian 
Big-3 -1.4% 14.0% 9.0%
Other -7.1% 0.3% -12.8%
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sample, including both period observations, we see the pattern 
of auditor switching that is identified in contemporary studies. 
Large firms, particularly large international firms, on average 
gain clients due to auditor switches. Furthermore, there were 
significantly more switches from large Canadian firms to large 
international firms during this period than vice versa (4.3% 
versus 0.5% of switches) and significantly more switches from 
“Others” to the large firms than vice versa (24.2% versus 7.5% of 
switches combining the two large-firm categories). This pattern 
of switches supports the inference that the large international 
audit firms were preferred, on average, to Canadian audit firms 
by those clients who switched auditors. Also, large audit firms 
were generally preferred to small audit firms by those clients 
who switched auditors. The models reviewed above suggest that 
this could occur if the large international firms had a better rep-
utation than large Canadian firms and large Canadian firms had 
a better reputation than smaller firms (“Others”).
 In the Depression period, the pattern of auditor switches 
is reversed for the large international firms. During this period, 
large international firms, on average, lost more clients to large 
Canadian firms than they gained due to switches (6.5% versus 
3.2%) and lost clients overall due to auditor switches. This does 
not imply that the large international firms were contracting 
during this period since growth can also occur through the 
growth of existing clients or through new client firms entering 
the market. The large Canadian firms gained clients, on aver-
age, during this period while the small firms lost clients due to 
switches but at a significantly lower rate than during the pre-
 Depression period. 
 If the relative reputation of audit firms remained the same 
throughout this time period, then this reversal of the net flow of 
clients may be explained by the effect of the Great Depression 
on the relationship between clients and audit firms. The change 
in the pattern of auditor switching over the period examined is 
consistent with the following explanation. Prior to the Depres-
sion, the expanding capital markets created competition for 
funds, and large audit firms benefited by being seen as increas-
ing the quality and credibility to financial statements compared 
with small firms. During the Depression, while this was un-
doubtedly still an issue, audit firms were adjusting their portfo-
lio of clients and/or refusing certain new clients to manage their 
business risk. This would explain a shift from large international 
firms to large Canadian firms if the Canadian firms had better 
knowledge of local conditions and, hence, could better manage 
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the business risk of some clients that the large international 
firms felt were too risky. This aggregate result is consistent with 
Cowperthwaite’s [1986, p. 22] observation that two of the Big-3 
International firms (Peat Marwick and Price Waterhouse) re-
fused to audit stockbrokers during the Depression. For this class 
of clients at least, the international firms were withdrawing their 
services because of increased business and reputation risks.
Alternative Explanations: There are at least three possible coun-
ter explanations to the interpretation offered here for the ob-
served pattern of auditor switching. First, it may be possible 
that the Depression encouraged client firms to become more 
price sensitive in their selection of audit firms (i.e., changes in 
the elasticity of demand). Second, it may be the case that the 
Depression resulted in the downsizing of client firms such that 
their needs were now better met by using the services of smaller 
audit firms. Finally, the pattern of switches may reflect changes 
in the pattern of mergers among audit firms over this period. 
Each of these alternatives is discussed below.
 The first alternative concerns possible price effects during 
the Depression. Unfortunately, no data are available concerning 
the pricing of audit services during this period. Theoretically, 
however, the shift of clients among auditors due to Depression-
induced price competition is unlikely. Price competition may 
have already affected the distribution of clients, but no new ef-
fects are anticipated due to the Depression. First, if the relative 
prices of audits from different categories of audit firms remain 
constant, then no shifts in demand should occur. There is no a 
priori reason to assume that the price deflation during the De-
pression should impact all professional firms equally. In fact, if 
auditors with better reputations are earning higher than average 
returns, then presumably they are better able to meet price com-
petition if this becomes a factor. Second, the demand for profes-
sional services has been found to be relatively income inelastic 
[e.g., less than 1, cf., Houthakker and Taylor, 1970]. In other 
words, the demand for a certain level of audit quality may be de-
termined by extrinsic factors such as regulatory and stakeholder 
requirements and is less affected by the income available to the 
firm to purchase these services.
 The second alternative explanation concerns possible chang-
es in the size of clients during the Depression. The possibility of 
changes in the demographic composition of clients has been 
addressed partially through the research design. Sample 2 uses 
firms as their own control for both periods. This appears to have 
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been a successful control for size. The firms that switched audi-
tors do not differ significantly in reported total assets (p=0.54). 
The firms that did not switch auditors groups also do not differ 
significantly in terms of reported assets (p=0.86). Furthermore, 
the firms that switched auditors did not differ significantly from 
those that did not switch auditors in either the pre-Depression 
(p=0.53) or Depression groups (p=0.80). Changes in client demo-
graphics are unlikely to explain the changing pattern of auditor 
switches.
 Finally, the pattern observed could reflect changes in the 
pattern of audit firm mergers specifically if the larger firms were 
engaged in more mergers prior to the Depression than after-
wards and client firms continued with the merged firm after the 
merger, thus creating the appearance of auditor switching to 
larger firms. We have already argued that the client’s choice of 
an auditor and the merged firm’s decision to retain a client are 
no different, in principle, during a merger than at other times. 
Unfortunately, there is little data on the pattern of audit firm 
mergers in Canada during this period so this alternative cannot 
be ruled out directly. One counter indicator is Collard [1983] 
who provides a list of mergers affecting both the Ross and 
 Touche audit firms in Canada. Only one merger is reported dur-
ing the period covered in this study, occurring in 1919. In terms 
of the data analyzed here, the number of audit firms represented 
in the data by year does not change significantly between the 
pre-Depression and Depression periods (pre-Depression, average 
= 91.3 accounting firms, s.d. = 9.6; Depression, average = 86, s.d. 




 This paper uses the Great Depression as a setting to ex-
plore the dynamics of the market for audit services in Canada 
in the face of an exogenous shock to normal patterns of audi-
tor switching. The theoretical literature suggested two possible 
associations between the Depression and patterns of auditor 
switches. First, it is possible that the increased importance of 
financial statement quality and credibility during the Depression 
could increase the association between the reputation and size 
of audit firm and auditor switches, reflected in a higher propor-
tion of auditor switches from small audit firms to large firms 
and from Canadian audit firms to international audit firms. 
Second, it is possible that the changes in the risk profile of audit 
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clients during the Depression could create incentives for audi-
tors to realign their portfolios to maintain profitability, resulting 
in more switches from large, better reputation firms to smaller 
firms or firms with a greater local knowledge of business risks. 
 The data support the hypothesis that there was a change in 
the pattern of auditor switches during the Depression compared 
with the pre-Depression period. In the Depression period (1930-
1941), small Canadian audit firms were less likely to lose clients 
to the international firms, and auditor switches were more likely 
to result in clients moving to smaller and lower-status auditors, 
reflected in an increase in switches from the International Big-3 
to the Canadian Big-3 and in an increase in switches from the 
Canadian Big-3 to “Other” Canadian firms. These results stand 
in marked contrast with contemporary accounting switching 
studies that show a consistent flow of clients to the large inter-
national firms. The data do not allow for tests of causal models, 
but based on current theories of auditor switching, one explana-
tion is that during the Depression the large international firms 
withdrew from or denied services to risky client firms, allow-
ing firms with higher risk tolerances or better knowledge of the 
Canadian market to benefit. This aggregate result is consistent 
with Cowperthwaite’s [1986, p. 22] observation that two of the 
Big-3 International firms (Peat Marwick and Price Waterhouse) 
refused to audit stockbrokers during the Depression. Several 
alternative explanations were also ruled out on theoretical or 
empirical grounds, but the cause of the shift in the pattern of 
auditor switches in this period bears further investigation.
 The period under consideration allows size and interna-
tional reputation/status to be associated with auditor switching 
decisions independently. The results show that in this setting 
both factors are related to switching behavior, implying that 
client firms could differentiate between Big-3 International 
firms, Big-3 Canadian firms, and “Others.” In the pre-Depres-
sion period, both large Canadian firms and international firms 
benefited from the movement of clients to larger firms. This 
suggests that clients were able to differentiate between the large 
and small Canadian firms. In the Depression period, the realign-
ment of clients also provides evidence that clients differentiated 
the international firms from larger and smaller Canadian firms. 
There is an apparent flow of clients down this chain of firms and 
an increase in the flow of clients directly from the International 
Big-3 to the smaller Canadian firms. Taken together, the pattern 
of auditor switches suggests that, even in this early stage of the 
development of the Canadian audit market, international repu-
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tation was more important than size in auditor choice decisions 
but that size, reflected in local market share, was a factor in 
such decisions.
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